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RESPECTING DEFERENCE: CONCEPTUALIZING
SKIDMORE WITHIN THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHEVRON
JIM Rossi*
This Article addresses critically the implications of the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Harris County,
120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), for standards of judicial review of agency
interpretations of law. Christensen is a notable case in the
administrative law area because it purports to clarify application of
the deference doctrine first articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944). By reviving this doctrine, Christensen narrows
application of the predominant approach to deference articulated in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), thus reducing the level of deference in many
appeals involving administrative agency interpretations oflaw. This
Article addresses the deference debate in this context, criticizing
Christensen, especially Justice Thomas's majority opinion. This
Article argues that the majority did not correctly apply Skidmore,
* Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law, 2000-2001; Patricia A. Dore
Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Scott Angstreich, Michael
Asimow, Cynthia Farina, Michael Herz, Harold Krent, Ronald Krotoszynski, Lars Noah,
Susan Rose-Ackerman, J.B. Ruhl, Peter Strauss, Russell Weaver, and Mark Seidenfeld for
their comments on a previous draft. [Editor's Note: At the time this Article went to press,
Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193
(2000), was still pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. See infra notes 21, 89, 184 and
accompanying text for citation of this case.]
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and that the Court's decision invites ad hocery by lower courts in
their review of agency legal interpretations. It concludes that
conceptualizing Skidmore within the architecture of Chevron's step
two-rather than as an alternative to the application of Chevron-
will best promote goals of accountability, uniformity, and flexibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Since it was decided in 1984, Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. l-a case commonly associated with
strong deference to agency interpretations of law-has taken on
canonical status as the "counter-Marbury" for the administrative
state.2 At the same time, the administrative law canon has not
completely ignored that it is "the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."' Particularly where courts
review the legal interpretations of administrative agencies, the
scope of the judiciary's province and duty remains a complex issue,
puzzling courts and commentators alike. It is also a source of
fragmentation on the Supreme Court, dividing its members in a
variety of different regulatory contexts.4
Given the complexity and divisiveness surrounding judicial
review of agency legal interpretations, it is rare when the Supreme
Court speaks about the issue with near unanimity. In Christensen
v. Harris County,5 eight justices agree that interpretive rules and
statements of policy issued by the acting administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor are not entitled
to Chevron deference. Instead, these informal agency statements-
by which Congress presumably did not intend an agency to speak
with the "force of law" 5-are to be afforded only "respect" under the
Skidmore doctrine.' Justice Scalia, himself no stranger to
administrative law issues, is the sole member of the Court to depart
from this rule.8 On its face, Christensen hints toward a large degree
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2074-75 (1990).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
4. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court was divided five to four in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). The justices agreed that Chevron
applied, but disagreed on their assessment of the context of Congress's delegation of
authority to the Food and Drug Administration to regulate cigarettes under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.
5. 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
7. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
8. See Christensen, 120S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J., concurring) (dissenting frommajority's
ruling that Skidmore applies to the agency interpretive statement, but agreeing with
majority's interpretation of the statute at issue). Scalia's position in Christensen should not
1108 [Vol. 42:1105
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of certainty regarding the scope of strong deference to agency
interpretations of law.
Beneath the surface, however, the justices in Christensen divide
on what, exactly, courts should use in place of Chevron. Skidmore
is commonly understood to be "weak deference" 9 -an approach to
statutory interpretation that dates back to the 1940s-but none of
the Christensen opinions explains how Skidmore deference is to
apply to statements such as that before the Court; in fact, the
opinions in Christensen take three distinct approaches to applying
Skidmore to the agency's interpretation." Thus, while the case
purportedly resolves one doctrinal debate-that Skidmore, not
Chevron, deference will apply to agency interpretive statements"-
it raises another: Exactly what is Skidmore "deference"?
With Christensen, Skidmore is emerging-some might say re-
emerging'-as an administrative law mainstay. Agencies publish
far more statements in the form of opinion letters, guidelines and
come as a surprise, given his previously expressed skepticism about Skidmore. See EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Notably, the other
administrative law scholar on the Court, Justice Breyer, is not unequivocally in the
majority's camp in Christensen, although he refrains from aligning himself with Justice
Scalia's position. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1667 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
Justice Scalia"may well be right" but falling short of rejectingSkidmore's application to the
opinion letter).
9. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1194-98 (1995); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1985) (describing
Skidmore deference as "nothing more than 'respect or courteous regard").
10. See infra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
11. Although the Court has spoken with apparent clarity on this issue in the context of
opinion letters where Congress did not delegate to the agency the "force of law" in this
regulatory mode, it did not limit Chevron's application to adjudication and notice-and-
comment rulemaking. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662. Thus it did not fully delimit the
scope of its rule. See William Funk, Supreme CourtNews, ADmmn. & REG. L. NEWs, Summer
2000, at 8; Steven Croley, The Scope of Chevron Jan 2001 (prepared for the Scope of Judicial
Review portion of the ABA Administrative Law Section's Project on the Administrative
Procedure Act), available at http-//www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apachevronscope2.doc.
12. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J., concurring) (assertingSkidmore is an
anachronism, "dating from an era in which we declined to give agency interpretations
authoritative effect"); see also Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift-
Judicial Deference toAgencyInterpretationsAfterEEOC v. Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166 (1992)
(asserting that Chevron and other strong deference cases replaced Skidmore, and that
Skidmore then experienced a revival). But see infra text accompanying notes 121-23
(suggesting that Skidmore was not counteijuxtaposed against strong deference until the
1970s).
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policy memoranda, now presumably subject to Skidmore deference,
than statements through adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, subject to Chevron deference. Thus, Skidmore will
potentially apply to judicial review of agency interpretations of law
in more instances than Chevron. Yet historically courts and
scholars have paid scant attention to what Skidmore deference
means. Few law review articles address the topic.'3 And, although
Skidmore has been around nearly forty years longer than Chevron,
it is cited by courts less than twenty percent as often. 14 This Article
argues, that by leaving Skidmore for ad hoc application by lower
courts, the Christensen decisionhas introduced even more confusion
into the maze of cases regarding judicial review of agency
interpretations of law.
Part I of this Article discusses the two predominant doctrinal
approaches to judicial review of agency statutory interpretations-
Chevron and Skidmore deference-within the framework of the
Christensen case. In favoring Skidmore "weak deference" over
Chevron step-two "strong deference," the Court resolved a debate
that has ensnared administrative law scholars for several years.
Although Christensen does not resolve every question regarding the
scope of Chevron deference, it clarifies that Skidmore "deference"
applies to many more agency statements that courts will review,
increasing thejudiciary's scrutiny of legal interpretations rendered
in agency interpretive and policy statements, including opinion
letters. 5
13. Exceptions include Asimow, supra note 9, at 1194-98 (contrasting"strong" to "weak"
deference and discussing purposes of Skidmore factors); Clark Byse,Scope ofJudicialReview
in InformalRulemaking, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 183,192 (1981) (arguing that Skidmore "respect"
differs from "great deference" because the "ultimate responsibility for determining the
meaning of the statute is the court's"); Diver, supra note 9, at 565 (describing Skidmore as
"nothing more than 'respect or courteous regard'"); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6ADMN. L.J.AM. U. 187,208-09
(1992) (arguingthatSkidmore lives on as a step-one Chevron inquiry); Yavelberg, supra note
12, at 184 (arguing that Skidmore places a burden of persuasion on the agency, requiring it
to "convince the court of the validity of the agency's view").
14. A search of Shepard's online citations reveals 1395 citing references to Skidmore in
federal and state opinions, while Chevron has 8293 citing references. Search conducted July
27, 2000.
15. Empirical evidence suggests that the tone the Supreme Court sets for standards of
review of agency decisions matters to lower courts, affecting affirmance and reversal rates
on appeal. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
1110 [Vol. 42:1105
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As Part I argues, however, the applications of Skidmore in the
various Christensen opinions are hardly likely to create certainty in
application of this rule. The majority and two dissenting opinions
in Christensen take no fewer than three distinct approaches to
applying Skidmore "deference." The majority opinion, written by
Justice Thomas, does not afford any deference to the agency
interpretation. Instead, it places the burden of persuasion on the
agency without applying any of the factors mentioned in the
Skidmore case.' 8Justice Stevens's dissent, by contrast, relies onthe
Skidmore factors, designed primarily to assess comparative
institutional competence to evaluate the persuasive force of the
agency's legal interpretation without eviscerating the presumption
of validity that historically attaches to agency action.'7 Still another
approach is implicit in Justice Breyer's dissent. 8 Like Justice
Stevens, Justice Breyer relies on some application of Skidmore's
institutional factors to uphold the agency interpretation; however,
his dissent also implicitly endorses a reinterpretation of Skidmore
within the framework of Chevron's deference analysis. These three
divergent approaches create uncertainty regarding the application
of Skidmore, posing confusion to lower courts as they begin
applying Skidmore deference to agency interpretive and policy
statements.
In Part H, this Article takes the occasion of Christensen as a
springboard for assessing Skidmore and its contrast to Chevron
deference. Justice Scalia asserts in his concurrence that the
majority's reliance onSkidmore is an anachronism, "dating from an
era in which we declined to give agency interpretations . . .
authoritative effect."' 9 This Article does not agree with Justice
Scalia's position, but Part H takes up the challenge his position
poses, with the objective of shedding light on Skidmore deference.
Three alternative possibilities, paralleling the approaches in
Christensen, are discussed: (1) that Skidmore deference or respect
only applies if a court, after rendering its own interpretation, agrees
with the agency's interpretation; (2) that Skidmore always advises
respect or deference, but evaluates the "persuasive power" of the
16. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
19. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1664 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111120011
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agency's position based on institutional factors; or (3) that Skidmore
operates under the shadow of a Chevron analysis. Part II argues
that approach (1), applied by the majority in Christensen, is not
supported by the case law or normative rationales for Skidmore
deference. Approaches (2) and (3) have much to commend; while
approach (2) is more consistent with existing case law, this Article
argues that approach (3), implicit in Justice Breyer's dissent, is
normatively preferable. This Chevron/Skidmore synthesis holds
promise to bridge the gap between the majority and Justices Scalia
and Breyer. Under this approach, Skidmore is read within the
architecture of Chevron deference, not as an alternative to Chevron
deference. In other words, Skidmore deference might be understood
as a type of heightened hard-look inquiry-reasonableness with a
bite-at Chevron's step two. The level of deference should not hinge
on whether an agency interpretation speaks with the "force of law"
(based on a hopelessly indeterminate analysis of congressional
intent); rather, where Congress has not expressly withheld an
agency's lawmaking powers, courts should focus on what level of
scrutiny applies at the Chevron step-two reasonableness inquiry
(based on the transparency of the procedure used by the agency).
The synthetic approach promotes uniformity, flexibility, and
legitimacy over alternative conceptions of Skidmore.
I. CHRISTENSEN AND THE (RE-?)EMERGENCE OF SKIDMORE
DEFERENCE
The Chevron case, often seen as a very pro-agency approach to
judicial review, has attracted the attention of administrative law
scholars since it was decided in 1984. Chevron stands at the center
of several major recent decisions by the Court;2  in the coming term
it remains an issue in other cases that the Court is considering.21 In
the 1999 term, however, the Court signaled a clear retreat away
from application of the Chevron test, most notably in Christensen,
a case that thrust Skidmore into a position that will eclipse Chevron
for many judicial appeals involving agency legal interpretations.
20. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001); Christensen, 120
S. Ct. at 1655; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
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A The Rise of Chevron Deference
Chevron, a unanimous opinion penned by Justice Stevens,
articulates what has become the predominant judicial paradigm for
review of agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. In
Chevron, the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA's) reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary
sources" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.22 The statute
required "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution
to comply with certain permit requirements and authorized the
EPA to define the relevant terms by regulation.' Initially, the EPA
determined that the "stationary source" referred to each individual
piece of equipment that emitted pollution, but in 1981 the agency
changed its position by construing "stationary source" more
expansively, to mean an entire plant. As an effect of this new inter-
pretation, firms could avoid some pollution permit requirements by
offsetting the pollution from new equipment by reducing emissions
from old equipment in the same plant.'
The Chevron Court's approach to reviewing an agency's statutory
interpretation distills the judicial review task into two distinct
steps. At step one of the Chevron test, the court inquires into
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."25 If Congress has-and has done so clearly-the court "must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
If, however, the statute at issue is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific question, a court is to move on to Chevron's
step two. Here, the court's inquiry is limited to determining
whether the agency's legal interpretation "is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."'At step two, Chevron endorses judicial
deference to the agency's statutory interpretation. By leaving a gap
in its statutory language for the agency to fill, Congress has made
"an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
22. Pub. L. No. 9595,91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7671
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
23. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840
n.1 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)).
24. See id. at 858-59.
25. Id. at 842.
26. Id. at 843.
27. Id.
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specific provision of the statute by regulation."' This gap, the
Supreme Court observed, may be explicit or implicit. 9 The role of
a court in such instances is to defer to the agency's statutory
interpretation, giving the agency's regulations "controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."" Justice Marshall's exhortation in Marbury v. Madison
that it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is"3 ' thus takes a back seat to an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the agency's legal interpretation at step two of
Chevron.
An appreciation of agency expertise, the limits of the specialized
knowledge of judges, and political accountability are at the
normative core of Justice Stevens's rationale for deference to the
agency in Chevron. "Judges are not experts in the field," Justice
Stevens wrote in Chevron, and thus in interpreting statutory gaps
courts should "rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments."32 Justice Stevens further
recognized that judicial deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation may increase political accountability:
[Tihe [EPA] Administrator's interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
and is entitled to deference .... Congress intended to
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level
of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged
with responsibility for administering the provision would be in
a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge
a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
agency.33
28. Id. at 843-44.
29. See id. at 865.
30. Id. at 844.
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
33. Id.
1114 [Vol. 42:1105
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Implicit in Justice Stevens's accountability rationale is the
recognition that agencies are institutionally superior to courts in
their capacity for making accountable political decisions against
the backdrop of ambiguous statutory terms.3 4 Agency legal
interpretations will be subject to political oversight and thus are
accountable to presidential politics, as well as congressional over-
sight.35 In addition, as Professor Peter Strauss has argued, Chevron
promotes uniformity in regulatory policy. Because the Supreme
Court has limited resources to resolve conflicting statutory inter-
pretations by lower courts, judicial acceptance of agency legal
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms will promote
uniformity in interpretation, thus providing regulated entities and
other branches of government some degree of certainty in assessing
the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms. 6
Although the impact of Chevron on the doctrinal approach of
lower courts is sometimes overstated, 7 studies suggest that the
decision did affect the reversal and remand rates for judicial
appeals of agency decisions in lower courts. Professors Peter S chuck
and E. Donald Elliott observe that affirmance rates increased by
almost fifteen percent after Chevron, and both remands and
reversals declined by roughly forty percent.3 " Another study finds
that the D.C. Circuit's deference to EPA interpretations increased
after Chevron.39 By setting the tone for application of standards of
review for lower courts, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
34. SeeMarkSeidenfeld,ASyncopatedChevronEmphasizingReasonedDecisionmaking
in ReviewingAgency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 96-97 (1994).
35. See, e.g., RichardJ. Pierce, Jr.,Political Control VersusImpermissible Bias inAgency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CmI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990)
(explaining that Chevron is justified by the agency's superior political accountability).
36., See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for JudicialReview ofAgencyAction, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1117-29 (1987).
37. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALEL.J. 969,
984 (1992).
38. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the ChevronStation:An Empirical Study
of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKEL.J. 984, 1058. The authors concluded, "On the
evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is sometimes able to effectively shape the court-
agency relationship through the kind of relatively broad, open-textured rule adopted in
Chevron." Id. at 1059.
39. See Aaron P. Avila, Student Article, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C.
Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398 (2000).
20011 1115
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standards of review for agency action have had very real conse-
quences for appeals of agency decisions.
B. Retreat From Chevron
At step two, Chevron endorses a strong notion of deference to the
agency's statutory interpretation. For years, however, the scope of
Chevron's application has puzzled courts. Chevron deference is
commonplace in reviewing agency legal interpretations adopted
through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. 0 It is not
confined to this regulatory procedure, though, and also applies to
agency legal interpretations made in the context of formal
adjudication where an agencyhas policymaldng powers," as well as
to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.' 2 Many more
informal agency actions, however, have been afforded a lesser
degree of deference than Chevron advises. 43
Skidmore v. Swift"-a case that preceded Chevron but with time
has come to stand in counterjuxtaposition to it'--is the earliest
case to suggest a lesser degree of deference for such statements. In
Skidmore, the Supreme Court addressed the level of deference
applicable to an interpretive Bulletin of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Administrator of Labor, as explained by the
Administrator's briefs on appeal.' Even though the rulings of the
Administrator were "not reached as a result of hearing adversary
proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and reaches
40. Chevron itself arose in the context of review of notice-and-comment rules. See
Chevron U.SA Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44,865-
66; see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (applying Chevron doctrine
to agency rulemaking); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (same).
41. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,425 (1999) (BIA order); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,418-19 (1992) (ICC order); Martin
v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,156-57 (1991) (enforcement citation); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (INS hearing).
42. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-63 (1997).
43. See infra note 59.
44. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
45. At the time of Skidmore, however, the Supreme Court had endorsed stronger
deference to agency interpretations of statutes in other contexts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-32 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941).
46. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138.
1116 [Vol. 42:1105
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conclusions of law from findings of fact," 7 the Court recognized that
they were entitled to "respect."48 Writing for the Court, Justice
Jackson said:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.49
In looking to the factors that make the agency's interpretation
persuasive, Skidmore echoed an approach the Court had earlier
endorsed in United States v. American TruckingAssociations, Inc.5 0
and Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States.51
Skidmore deference is sometimes referred to as "weak deference,"
in contrast to the strong deference that has evolved post-Chevron.2
It is deference nevertheless, as Justice Jackson recognized in
providing normative reasons for the Court's approach."3 As
47. Id. at 139.
48. See id. at 140.
49. Id.
50. 310 U.S. 534,549 (1940) (noting agency interpretations are entitled to "great weight"
where they are contemporaneous with the adoption of a statute, and that the court evaluates
"persuasiveness" of agency's interpretations in light of this and other factors).
51. 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) ("[Aldministrative practice, consistent and generally
unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the
command is indefinite and doubtful.").
52. See supra note 9.
53. In its initial years, Skidmore was recognized as representing a type of deference-not
as an extreme contrast to strong deference and certainly not as requiring de novo review of
agency legal interpretations by courts. See, e.g., Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative
Discretion in the Interpretation ofStatutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 481 (1950) (observing that
Skidmore requires courts to give respect to agency legal interpretations, even when not
reached through adversarial litigation, and that courts may even give such statements
decisiveweight, dependingonthe context);Recent Cases, 59 HARV.L.REV. 794,798-99 (1946)
(citingSkidmore for thepropositionthat"[rieviewing courts, recognizingthe experience and
familiarity of administrative agencies with the field to be regulated, generally give great
weight to their interpretative rulings"); see also infra text accompanying notes 121-23
20011 1117
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Skidmore explained, an agency administrator's rulings are entitled
to some respect because they are "made in pursuance of official
duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader
investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in
a particular case."54 Agencies determine policy on behalf of
government and provide guidance for the enforcement of statutes.55
By giving weight to agency interpretations, courts avoid resorting
to legislative history as a means of discerning statutory meaning.56
Moreover, as Peter Strauss has argued is the case with Chevron,57
judicial respect for agency interpretation of law under Skidmore
allows for enhanced consistency in the application of statutes.5"
Without a doubt, however, Skidmore affords less deference than
Chevron.
In the spirit of Skidmore, various cases decided since Chevron
refused to extend Chevron deference to agencyinterpretations made
in the context of informal agency decisions or statements, such
as appellate briefs, manuals, and opinion letters; but, before
Christensen these cases did not clearly address Chevron's
appropriate scope.59 Among scholars, Professor Robert Anthony has
(suggesting that Skidmore was not contrasted to stronger notions of deference until the
1970s).
54. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
55. See id. at 139-40.
56. Elsewhere, Justice Jackson disparaged courts' use of legislative history as an aid to
statutory interpretation. See United States v. Public Utils. Comnm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295,320
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that judicial use of legislative history"pulls federal
law, not only out of the dark where it has been hidden, but into a fog in which little can be
seen if found"); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951)
(Jackson J., concurring) (raising separation of powers concerns with respect to legislative
history).
57. See supra note 36; see also Asimow, supra note 9, at 1203-06 (arguing that Skidmore
advances uniformity, but conceding that Chevron is superior in this respect).
58. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 13940 (noting that the agency's interpretation "will guide
applications for enforcement by injunction on behalf of the Government" and that the
standards for public and private enforcement should be "at variance only where justified by
very good reasons").
59. Compare Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993) (finding no Chevron
deference for Sentencing Commission Guideline commentary), and EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244,256-58 (1991) (finding EEOC guidelines not entitled to Chevron deference,
but that Skidmore applies instead), with Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 62 (1995) (giving
Bureau of Prisons Program Statement Chevron deference), and NationsBank v. Variable
AnnuityLife Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,256-57 (1995) (holding that Comptroller ofthe Currency's
opinion letter warrants Chevron deference), and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
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been the strongest proponent of the view that Chevron deference
should not apply to agency interpretations adopted in informal
decision-making procedures. As he argues, "Where the format is an
informal one, it ordinarily does not carry the force of law, and a
reviewing court is not bound by the agency interpretation, though
it should give special consideration to the agency opinion."60 The
key, according to Professor Anthony, is the delegation inquiry:
"whether Congress intended an interpretation in this format to
have the force of law."6" If so, Chevron applies; 2 if not, a court
should only afford the agency legal interpretation Skidmore
consideration.63
Christensen effectively adopts Anthony's view, signaling a clear
move away from Chevron and toward Skidmore deference for many
agency appeals making their way to federal courts. In Christensen,
the Court reviews an interpretation of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)," which gives both public and private sector
employees a statutory right to compensation for overtime work,
payable in cash, in the context of a private challenge to a county's
policy that conflicted with a federal agency's legal interpretation.65
An exception to this general rule, articulated in section 207 of the
FLSA, allows states and their political subdivisions to compensate
public sector employees for overtime by granting them "comp time,"
entitling them to take time off from work with full pay.66 Not
496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990) (giving opinion letter Chevron deference).
60. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990).
61. Id. at 43-44.
62. See id. at 4041.
63. See id. at 41.
64. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1658-60 (2000).
65. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,207 (1994 & Supp. 1111997), cited in Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at
1658-62.
66. The provision of the statute in dispute states:
An employee...
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off.. ., and
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted
by the employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after
making the request ifthe use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt
the operations of the public agency.
Id. at § 207(oX5), quoted in Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1660. If employees fail to use their
accumulated "comp time," employers are "obligated to pay cash compensation under certain
circumstances." Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1658 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(o)(3)-(4)).
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surprisingly, many public employers became concerned with the
cost of accumulated compensatory time for employees who worked
overtime after reaching the statutory cap on compensatory time
accrual and for employees who left their jobs with significant
reserves of accrued time.
As a way of addressing this concern, Harris County, Texas
proposed to schedule employees to use or take compensatory time,
thus reducing its levels of accrued compensatory time." Harris
County wrote to the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Division, inquiring "whether the [County] Sheriff may schedule
nonexempt employees to use or take compensatory time."6" In
response to this inquiry, the Acting Administrator of the Division
rendered an interpretation of the applicable statute and regulations
in an opinion letter:
[It is our position that a public employer may schedule its
nonexempt employees to use their accrued FLSA compensatory
time as directed if the prior agreement specifically provides
such a provision....
Absent such an agreement, it is our position that neither the
statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require an
employee to use accrued compensatory time.69
Dismissing the language of the federal agency's opinion letter,0
Harris County implemented a policy that allowed the employee's
supervisor to set a maximum number of compensatory hours that
could be accumulated and provided for notification to the employee
once the maximum number of hours was approached. The policy
also permitted the employee to voluntarily take steps to reduce
accumulated compensatory time, and allowed the supervisor to
order the employee to use compensatory time if the employee did
not voluntarily do so.7 This policy was challenged by employees of
67. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1659.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1659 (quoting Op. Ltr. Dep't Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (Sept. 14, 1992),
available in 1992 WL 845100 (Opinion Letter)).
70. See id.
71. See id.
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the County Sheriffs Office, each of whom agreed to accept
compensatory time in lieu of cash as compensation for overtime.72
The Supreme Court agrees with a decision issued by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upholding the Harris County
policy despite the conflicting interpretation of the statute by the
federal agency.73 The significance of the Christensen case is in the
Court's approach to weighing the agency's statutory interpretation.
Since each Justice agrees that the statutory language at issue in
Christensen was silent or ambiguous with respect to the legality of
the Harris County policy,74 Chevron would advise deference to the
agency's reasonable statutory interpretation. By contrast, Skidmore
would afford respect, dependent on the "persuasive force" of the
agency's position.7' The majority opts for Skidmore deference for
agencyinterpretive and policy statements.76 All in all, eight Justices
(with Justice Scalia the lone dissenter on the issue) agree that
Skidmore deference applies to an agency legal interpretation in an
opinion letter. As the majority reasons, an interpretation contained
in an opinion letter is "not one arrived at after, for example, a
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking."7 7 Thus, it
concludes, "[ilnterpretations such as those in opinion letters-like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do
not warrant Chevron-style deference."78  Instead, it holds,
"interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are
72. See id. at 1658.
73. See id. at 1660.
74. See id. at 1660,1662 (suggesting that the statute is silent on the issue, and implying
that Chevron deference would be appropriate if Chevron applied); id. at 1663 (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 1664 (Scalia, J., concurring) (applying Chevron's step-two to the
interpretation). But see id. at 1668 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (implying that Chevron step-two
deference would be appropriate if the Chevron case applies); id. at 1667 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting agreement with Justice Breyer's comments on Chevron).
75. See a at 1663.
76. See id-
77. 1& at 1662.
78. Id. at 1662-63 ("[1Internal agency guideline, which is not 'subject to the rigors of the
Administrative Procedur[e] Act, including notice and comment,' entitled only to 'some
deference.') (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil, Inc.,
499 U.S. 244,256-58 (1991) ("[Ilnterpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference.");
Martinv. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,157 (1991) ("[Interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines
are not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the
Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers.'" (citation omitted)).
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'entitled to respect" under Skidmore, "but only to the extent that
those interpretations have the 'power to persuade.'" 9 For the
majority, the agency interpretation in Christensen was not
persuasive and thus the Harris County policy was upheld."
Although the Court does not fully explain its rationale, three
reasons support its application of Skidmore over Chevron deference
to the opinion letter at issue in Christensen. First, and most
formalistic, the Court recognizes that suchinterpretations "lack the
force of law,"8" presumably in the sense that Congress did not
intend the informal mode of statement that the agency had chosen
to be binding on courts or regulatees. By contrast, other more
formal modes of agency decision, such as adjudication or
rulemaking, are binding to the extent that Congress has formally
delegated to the agency the authority to elucidate specific statutory
provisions by these modes. 2 At least for the majority, the scope of
Chevron deference is thus a function of the agency's delegated
powers, not solely a function of silence or ambiguity in a statute."
Decisions following Christensen make this the touchstone to
whether Skidmore rather than Chevron applies.8"
Second, the majority observes that the process leading to the
interpretation was "not one arrived at after" the type of vetting and
deliberation afforded by other procedures, such as formal
79. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1663 (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
80. See id
81. See id. at 1662.
82. See id. The majority draws a clear distinction between interpretations contained in
opinion letters and those arrived at by more "formal" means. See id.
83. See id. at 1663. Although Justice Scalia chastises this approach, Justice Breyer
endorses it. See id. at 1667-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Chevron does not
apply where "one has doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive
authority to the agency (an 'ambiguity' that Chevron does not presumptively leave to agency
resolution)"). But see id. at 1664 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (strongly criticizing Justice
Breyer's suggestion).
84. See U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2000) (noting that key consideration is whether Congress intended agency to use format to
act with "the force oflaw" (quoting Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662)); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347 n.6 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000) (declining to
grant Chevron-style deference where formal rulemaking procedures are absent); see also In
re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (focusing on whether agency expression
.assumes a form expressly provided for by Congress" (quoting Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S.
144, 157 (1991))); Gonzalez v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(relying on agency's exercise of delegated power).
[Vol. 42:11051122
RESPECTING DEFERENCE
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. 5 For these more
formal procedures, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes
procedural requirements designed to enhance public participation
and build an explanatory record for the agency's decision.86 Where
the agency's interpretation is adopted without such public partici-
pation and with no guarantee of an explanatory record, heightened
judicial scrutiny of the agency's statutory interpretation enhances
the legitimacy of the agency's action."' Christensen does not,
however, reconcile its approach with previous cases in which the
Court extended Chevron deference to agency interpretations
embodied in informal action.88 A case pending before the Court
provides an opportunity to clarify the appropriate level of deference
for agency interpretations expressed through modes that are less
formal than substantive rules and formal orders.8 9
Third, although not mentioned in any of the Christensen opinions,
separation of powers principles may have influenced the Court's
decision. Arguably, in Christensen, as in Skidmore, the Court
exercises traditional Article III powers, since the agency's
interpretation was before the Court in the context of review of an
employment dispute between two nonagency parties, not in a
context where a federal agency itself was exercising its regulatory
authority.9' When a court is exercising traditional Article III powers
85. See id at 1662.
86. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994) (giving interested persons the right to participate in
rulemaking through submission ofwritten data, views or arguments, and requiring a concise
general statement of basis and purpose for rules); id. § 554 (providing interested persons the
opportunity to submit and have considered facts and arguments in adjudicative hearings
prior to final agency decision).
87. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1665 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that an agency
rationale appearing for the first time in legal proceedings may he found legitimate and
therefore be accorded deference).
88. See cases cited supra note 59; see also Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (making this observation and citing previous cases).
89. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (presenting the question of whether Chevron deference extends to a
Customs Service tariff clarification ruling interpreting statutory tariff structures).
90. In a similar manner, Professor John Manning has argued that separation ofpowers
principles advise Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference forjudicial review of an agency's
legal interpretation of its own regulations, even in contexts where a court is reviewing the
agency's own regulatory decisions. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681
(1996) ([T]he [Supreme] Court should... embrac[e] the approach of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., which adopts a standard of review that accounts for agency expertise and experience.
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in adjudicating a private dispute before it, as in Christensen, for
separation of powers reasons interpretative rules and policy
statements might require independent judicial judgment.
With the single exception of Justice Scalia, all members of the
Court agree that Skidmore deference should apply to the opinion
letter in Christensen.1 Justice Scalia concurs with the majority's
bottom line regarding the legality of Harris County's policy, but he
refuses to apply Skidmore in the case for several reasons. Most
notably, Justice Scalia reasons, "Skidmore deference . . . is an
anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give
agency interpretations (including interpretive regulations, as
opposed to "legislative rules") authoritative effect."92 This approach,
Justice Scalia argues, came to an end with the Chevron case.9" In all
instances where Congress has left a gap in statutory language,
Scalia maintains, "'a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency."' 4 Justice Scalia also observes that
applying Skidmore to the Christensen facts is inconsistent with
precedent because elsewhere the Court has applied Chevron
deference under circumstances that would not be allowed under
Christensen." Finally, and by no means least significantly, Justice
Scalia directly takes Justice Breyer's dissent to task by rejectingthe
claim that the application of Chevron deference hinges on a first
order inquiry into congressional intent to delegate interpretive
authority to the agency. For Justice Scalia, Chevron creates a
* . ."). Manning argues that under such an approach, "the agency bears the burden of
persuading the court to exercise its independent judgment in the agency's favor. In exercising
such judgment, however, the reviewing court must take account of the special resources that
the agency brings to the task." Id.
91. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1663, 1664.
92. Id. at 1664 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
259 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
93. See id.
94. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
95. See id. (citing NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57
(1995) (regarding a letter opinion of the Comptroller of the Currency); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990) (regarding an opinion letter); Young v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978-79 (1986) (concerning a Federal Register
Notice)).
1124 [Vol. 42:1105
RESPECTING DEFERENCE
presumption that in all ambiguous statutes Congress intended to
do so.9
6
So, Justice Scalia reasons, even if Chevron deference applies to
an agency's legal interpretation, this does not mean that the agency
interpretation will be upheld. As Professor Russell Weaver has
argued, Chevron does not give all agency interpretations the "force
of law." The majority's opinion in Christensen fails to fully
appreciate the distinction. As Justice Scalia recognizes, Chevron
means only that the Court will uphold interpretations that are not
arbitrary and capricious. 98 Arbitrary and capricious review is
therefore a necessary predicate to a finding that an agency
statement has the force of law. Nevertheless, because Justice Scalia
does not consider the Secretary's interpretation of the statute at
issue in Christensen to be reasonable, he agrees with the majority's
conclusion regarding the legality of the Harris County policy.99
C. The Emergence of Ad Hoc Skidmore Deference
Although Christensen clarifies that Skidmore deference applies
to most agency interpretive and policy statements outside of
adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking,' ° it also creates
much uncertainty regarding how Skidmore should be applied to
agency interpretations of law. The uncertainty can be illustrated by
contrasting the majority's approach in applying Skidmore to the
statute at issue in Christensen with the applications of Skidmore in
dissents by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. There are no less
than three distinct approaches among the Court's members as to
how Skidmore applies to agency statutory interpretations.
1. The Majority's Application of Skidmore
In writing for the majority, Justice Thomas begins his analysis
of the statutory interpretation issue not by addressing deference
96. See id. at 1664 n.*; see also supra note 83 (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent).
97. Russell L.Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, and FormatRequirements, 4O U.KAN.
L. REV. 587, 612 (1992).
98. See supra note 92-96 and accompanying text.
99. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1665 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 1663.
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but by deciding which interpretation of the statute-that rendered
by the petitioners and U.S., or that rendered by Harris County-he
believes "better."1 Petitioners and the U.S. contended "that the
FLSA implicitly prohibits such a practice in the absence of an
agreement or understanding authorizing compelled use."10 2 The
majority characterizes this argument as based upon the canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "contending that the [FLSA's]
express grant of control to employees to use compensatory time,
subject to the limitation regarding undue disruptions of workplace
operations, implies that all other methods of spending compen-
satory time are precluded."10 3
Before it addresses the weight afforded the agency interpretation,
the majority states, "[w]e find this reading unpersuasive."' The
majority reasons that the canon expressio unius does not resolve
this case in favor of the petitioners. The FLSA, the majority
observes, did not require the expenditure of comp time; a "better
reading" is that it set up "a safeguard to ensure that an employee
will receive timely compensation for working overtime."' 5 Thus, the
provision of the FLSA in dispute is "more properly read as a
minimal guarantee that an employee will be able to make some use
of compensatory time when he requests to use it."' ° Given this, the
majority opines that the "proper expressio unius inference is that an
employer may not, at least in the absence of an agreement, deny an
employee's request to use compensatory time for a reason other
than that provided [in the statute]."'07 The majority concludes,
[We think the better reading of §207(o)(5) is that it imposes a
restriction upon an employer's efforts to prohibit the use of
compensatory time when employees request to do so; that
provision says nothing about restricting an employer's efforts to
require employees to use compensatory time. Because the
statute is silent on this issue and because Harris County's
101. See id. at 1661.
102. Id. at 1660.
103. Id. Justice Stevens, in a dissent, challenges this characterization of the petitioner's
argument. See id. at 1666 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1660.
105. Id. at 1661.
106. Id. ( mphasis added).
107. Id.
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policyis entirely compatible with §207(o)(5), petitioners cannot
... prove that Harris County has violated §207.108
Only once it engages in this analysis does the majority purport to
apply Skidmore deference. However, in its application of Skidmore
the majority summarily dismisses any notion of deference to the
agency and does not refer to any of the Skidmore factors. Instead,
with but a brusque nod to Skidmore, it refers to its own
independent reading of the statute, concluding in a single sentence
that "we find unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the
statute at issue in this case."'0 9 Given this conclusion, the majority
summarily states that the agency's interpretation of the statute did
not warrant Skidmore respect.110
The Christensen majority's application of Skidmore deference
goes something like this: A court makes its own interpretation of
the statute, comparing it to the interpretation of the litigants. In so
doing, the court determines whether it is persuaded that the
agency's interpretation is "better,""' without affording the agency's
interpretation any presumption of validity. If the agency's
interpretation is "unpersuasive,""2 no deference is due under
Skidmore. Only after determining which reading of the statute it
believes best does the majority decide what level of deference to
afford the agency interpretation.
2. Justice Stevens's Dissent and Skidmore
Justice Stevens's dissent in Christensen offers an alternative
application of Skidmore deference. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
agrees with the agency's interpretation."' Like the majority, he
does not begin his assessment of the statute with any reference to
the level of deference to the agency interpretation. Instead, he
begins by critiquing the majority's interpretation."' He also
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1663.
110. See id. (suggestingSkidmore respect applies only to the extent that an interpretation
has the "power to persuade (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
111. See id. at 1661.
112. See id. at 1663.
113. See i& at 1665-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 1665.
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observes that the majority mischaracterizes the agency's argument
on appeal:
The Department, it should be emphasized, does not suggest that
forced-use policies are forbidden by the statute or regulations.
Rather, its judgment is simply that, in accordance with the
basic rule governing compensatory time set down by the
statutory and regulatory scheme, such policies may be pursued
solely according to the parties' agreement."5
Justice Stevens concludes, "[because there is no reason to believe
that the Department's opinion was anything but thoroughly
considered and consistently observed, it unquestionably merits our
respect." 116 In contrast to the majority, Justice Stevens relies on at
least two of the Skidmore factors-thoroughness of the agency's
consideration and consistency of the agency's position-in deciding
whether the agency's interpretation was persuasive and warrants
respect. Thus, Justice Stevens's application of Skidmore relies more
explicitly than the majority on the Skidmore factors, designed to
assess the relative decision-making capacity of the agency vis-h-vis
the reviewing court.
3. Skidmore in Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, agrees with Justice
Stevens's conclusion and analysis, adding three additional points.
First, while Justice Stevens's application of Skidmore focuses on
two of the Skidmore factors-thoroughness of consideration and
consistency-Justice Breyer also addresses Skidmore's third factor.
"[P]articularly in a rather technical case such as this one," Justice
Breyer writes, "an agency's views... 'meri[t] ... respect.""1 7
Second, Justice Breyer does not shut the door to the possibility,
unequivocally argued in Justice Scalia's dissent, that Chevron
deference is not necessarily inappropriate for an opinion letter.""
115. Id. at 1667.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1668 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1667 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
118. See id. at 1667 (noting Justice Scalia"may well be right" but falling short of rejecting
Skidmore's application to the opinion letter).
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If Chevron deference applies, however, Justice Breyer would
conclude that the agency's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable-the opposite result of Justice Scalia." 9 Third, Justice
Breyer implies that Skidmore deference is a type of Chevron step
two reasonableness inquiry. He states that "the Labor Department's
position in this matter is eminently reasonable, hence persuasive,
whether one views that decision through Chevron's lens, through
Skidmore's, or through both."2 Thus, for Breyer, to the extent
Skidmore's "persuasive" standard applies, it may be equivalent to
Chevron's step-two deference inquiry.
II. TOWARD A CHEVRONISKIDMORE SYNTHESIS
Skidmore had little grip on the mind ofthe administrative lawyer
of the 1950s or 1960s. In fact, one of the leading treatises of the era,
Professor Louis Jaffe's Judicial Control of Administrative Action,
does not cite to Skidmore a single time in its 720 pages of text."
Other contemporaneous commentators, such as Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis and Professor Clark Byse advocated various versions of
Skidmore deference,2 but it was not universally juxtaposed as the
alternative to strong deference, whether under Chevron or earlier
cases such as Gray and Hearst, until the mid-1970s. 3 Christensen
has further thrust Skidmore into the limelight for future appeals of
administrative actions. What Christensen does not answer,
however, is what, exactly, Skidmore deference means, if it can be
said to be "deference" at all.
Justice Scalia's approach-abandoningSkidmore altogether-has
simplicity on its side and avoids a judicial inquiry into whether
Congress has delegated to an agency authority to regulate with the
"force of law." At the same time, it is inconsistent with cases
119. See id. at 1668 (stating that "the Labor Department's position in this matter is
eminently reasonable).
120. Id. at 1668 (emphasis added).
121. See .Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIqSTRATIVE ACTION 729-70 (1965)
(providing table of cited cases).
122. See KENNETHCuLPDAViS,ADMINISTRATIVELAwTREATISE § 30.14 (1958) (discussing
a variety of discretion factors, including the factors expressed by the Supreme Court in
Skidmore); Byse, supra note 13, at 191-93 (explaining Skidmore "respect").
123. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see also Yavelberg, supra note
12, at 175-76 (claiming that Gilbert "revived a then-dormant Skidmore doctrine").
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decided by both the Supreme Court and lower courts suggesting
that more judicial scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing nontrans-
parent decision-making procedures, such as legal interpretations
adopted outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Heightened
judicial review may enhance- the legitimacy of agency interpretive
and policy statements-such as that in the letter at issue in
Christensen-because these statements were not fully vetted
through transparent and deliberative decision-making procedures.
Scholars such as Robert Anthony and John Manning have forcefully
argued that a lesser degree of deference may be necessary to
promote legitimacy in such circumstances.' 24
Christensen fails to resolve, however, how Skidmore deference
will be applied. In fact, the majority and dissenting opinions in
Christensen reflect three distinct positions: (1) that Skidmore
deference applies only if a court, after rendering its own
interpretation, still finds the agency's interpretation persuasive; (2)
that Skidmore is always a type of varying deference, the degree of
which is based on institutional factors; or (3) that Skidmore
operates under the shadow of a Chevron analysis. As this Section
argues, the first approach, applied by the majority in Christensen,
is not supported by the case law and risks undermining the
normative rationale for Skidmore deference. The second and third
approaches are consistent with the case law and the normative
rationale for Skidmore deference. While the second approach may
be more consistent with existing case law, this Article concludes
that the third approach, implicit in Justice Breyer's dissent, is
normatively preferable. This Chevron/Skidmore synthesis holds
promise to bridge the gap between the majority and Justices Scalia
and Breyer.
124. See Anthony, supra note 60, at 55-60; Manning, supra note 90, at 686-90. Manning
argues for Skidmore deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. Ironically,
Christensen advises Skidmore deference for an agency's interpretation of statutes, but
Chevron deference for an agency's interpretations of its own regulations, see Christensen, 120
S. Ct. at 1663, perhaps for reasons ofjudicial economy and uniformity. See Strauss, supra
note 36, at 1121-22 (defending Chevron as promoting uniformity in legal decisions). For a
useful discussion of this aspect of Christensen, see Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron:
A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 49 (2000).
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A "Persuasiveness" Triggers Respect
The majority in Christensen places emphasis on whether the
agency interpretation was "better" or "more proper" than alter-
native explanations.' In evaluating"persuasiveness," however, the
majority does not assess institutional factors associated with the
agency's expertise; instead, it renders its own independent inter-
pretation of the statute. In the course of rendering this
interpretation, it places the burden of persuasion on the agency,
effectively giving the agency interpretation no weight.
In the Supreme Court's precedents, this independent inter-
pretation view 6 is best exemplified by Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB.' There, the Court reviewed a Labor Board determination
that shop foremen are "employees" subject to the National Labor
Relations Act. The agency certified a union to represent foremen at
the Packard Motor Car Company and issued a cease and desist
order against the company for its refusal to bargain with the
union. 8 While the Court-with Justice Jackson again writing for
the majority-upheld the agency's determination, it characterized
the issue-whether the cease and desist order was authorized by
statute-as a "naked question of law."' 9 As Justice Jackson stated
in his majority opinion, there was "no ambiguity in this Act to be
clarified by resort to legislative history.""'0 The Packard Court's
determination that the statute was unambiguous is puzzling-
especially because "the Court itself noted [that] foremen fell
squarely within . . . the definition of' both "employee" and
"employer" in the statute' 3 --but the Court independently parsed
the statutory language based on context. In the Court's view, there
is no construction of the statute that would exclude foremen from
125. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
126. See Asimow, supra note 9, at 1194; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 ADmIN. L. REV. 363, 366 (1990).
127. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
128. See id. at 488.
129. Id. at 493.
130. Id. at 492. This is consistent with Justice Jackson's concerns about resorting to
legislative history in other contexts. See supra note 56.
131. William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited. Politics as a Determinant of Deference
Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 466 n.78
(1989).
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the definition of employee. 3 2 Even though Packard upheld the
agency, it made no reference to the agency's reasoning and did not
afford the agency's position any weight. Skidmore itself would not
necessarily have led to affirmance of the agency, but it is notable
that Packard failed to support giving some weight to agency
interpretations of law.' 33
While the Christensen majority pays lip service to Skidmore, its
method bears more in common with the independent interpretation
approach of Packard. The statute at issue in Christensen, unlike the
statute at issue in Packard, is characterized by the Court as
ambiguous or silent on the issue.'3 ' Despite any ambiguity in the
statutory language, the majority adopts the interpretation it deems
the "better" or "more proper" one. This interpretation is selected not
by comparing the majority's assessment of statutory meaningto the
agency's, taking into account the agency interpretation's "power to
persuade." In fact, at no point does the majority assess the degree
of weight it attaches to the agency's interpretation. In contrast, the
majority seems to suggest that Skidmore "respect," or deference, is
triggered only to the extent that the agency interpretation has the
"power to persuade," which the majority claims is equivalent to
whether the interpretation is "persuasive."135 Moreover, Justice
Thomas's majority opinion attempts to find meaning by treating the
exercise of statutory interpretation as a word play, but he is
disinclined to look beyond the very limited palette of the statute's
text.136
The effect of this approach is to place the burden of persuasion on
the agency. In other words, Skidmore deference-or "respect"-is
not triggered until, after an independent interpretation by the
132. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 488 (stating that "[tihe context of the Act... leaves no room
for a [contrary] construction").
133. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing Skidmore); see also NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 134-45 (1944) (applying the rational basis test to the
NLRB's interpretation); Grayv. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,412 (1941) (statingthatwhen Congress
leaves a determination to an agency, the"delegationwillbe respected andthe administrative
conclusion left untouched" by the Court).
134. The Justices unanimously agree on this issue. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
135. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1663 (2000).
136. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future ofthe ChevronDoctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 373 (1994) (criticizing tendency of Justice Thomas and other textualists ofimaginative interpretation, due to the small interpretive palette they work with).
[Vol. 42:11051132
RESPECTING DEFERENCE
Court, the agency's interpretation is deemed persuasive. Because
in Christensen the majority does not consider the agency's
interpretation to be persuasive, the interpretation is not entitled to
any deference. Thus, the majority approach seems to have more in
commonwithPackard and the independent interpretation approach
than with cases applying deference, even cases such as Skidmore,
which advise "respect" rather than strong deference. Under the
majority approach in Christensen, if the Court finds the agency
interpretation persuasive, it is then entitled to Skidmore "respect."
Even under the approach of the Christensen majority, this
presumably does not mean that the agency interpretation will
always be upheld. Instead, once the Court begins to apply
deference, the agency interpretation will be given the degree of
respect it warrants under the Skidmore factors. Because the
majority does not find the agencyinterpretation persuasive over the
majority's independent interpretation, however, it completely
ignores the Skidmore factors.
The approach of the Christensen majority finds support in a
strong separation of powers rationale for the distinction between
Skidmore and Chevron deference.1" 7 Courts applying this under-
standing of Skidmore make their own independent checks of agency
statutory interpretation. This promotes transparency, enhanced
deliberation, and limited executive official discretion, values at the
core of traditional separation of powers principles. 8 The
Christensen .majority's approach, however, is clearly limited in its
scope. One reason that the majority in Christensen takes the
approach that it does is that, under the statute, the burden of proof
was clearly on the employee-petitioners, who relied on the agency's
interpretation." 9 In fact, the majority seems to conflate the burden
of proof with the standard of review of the agency's legal
interpretation, even though they could have easily been kept
separate conceptually. Because the Court is exercising traditional
Article IlI powers in assessing a matter between nonagency
137. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 90 (urging Skidmore as a standard for review of an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations for separation of power reasons, noting that
under Skidnore the burden of persuasion is on the agency).
138. See id. at 696.
139. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1661 (requiringpetitioners to prove violation of section
207) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994)).
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litigants,40 it is probably more comfortable heightening the burden
for the agency's interpretation than it would be were it reviewing
the regulatory decision of a federal agency.
B. Sliding Scale Deference Based on Application of Institutional
Factors
The Christensen majority's application of Skidmore effectively
eviscerates any presumption of validity in favor of an agency's
interpretation, instead inviting courts to make their own
independent interpretations of statutes before applying any sort of
Skidmore deference. Assessing the "persuasiveness" of an agency's
legal interpretation, however, is not the same as an evaluation of its
"power to persuade." Under Skidmore, agency interpretations are
"not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority," 4 but
they may still be persuasive by reason of their institutional source.
Skidmore evaluates the power to persuade with respect to several
factors, such as the agency's expertise, the thoroughness of its
consideration and the consistency of its position. 42
In support of its method, the Christensen majority relies on
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).1' Aramco, however,
departs from the majority's method. Instead of conflating the
"persuasiveness" of an interpretation with its "power to persuade,"
the Aramco Court separated the two inquiries. Aramco addressed
the degree of deference the Court should afford the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's position that Title VII
applies extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of
U.S. companies employing U.S. citizens abroad.'44 The Court found
Title VII ambiguous,'45 as it does the statute in Christensen.'46
Relying on a presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes absent Congressional intent to the contrary, the Court
140. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
141. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
142. See id.
143. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
144. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991).
145. See id. at 250-51.
146. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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rejected the agency's position."' In this sense, the case bears
similarity to the majority approach in Christensen.
Aramco did not, however, hold that the general burden of
persuasion of a statutory interpretation under Skidmore is always
on the agency, as the majority in Christensen suggests. To begin,
Aramco can easily be limited to instances in which a countervailing
presumption of statutory construction advises against the agency
interpretation absent clear congressional intent to the contrary."
Notwithstanding its lip service to expressio unius-a position
contested by Justice Stevens's dissent" 9-- the majority in
Christensen does rely on a presumption of statutory construction as
compelling its interpretation over the agency's.
A further distinction between the application of Skidmore in
Aramco and Christensen is that the Aramco majority, unlike the
majority in Christensen, applied Skidmore deference even though
it was not persuaded by the agency's interpretation. The
Christensen majority would have held that no respect was due to
the agency's interpretation under Skidmore because the
interpretation is not persuasive to the majority. By contrast, the
Aramco majority recognized that even though Congress had not
conferred rulemaking authority on the EEOC, "the level of
deference afforded 'will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which
give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 5 In
evaluating the level of deference applicable to the EEOC, the
Aramco majoritythen evaluated each oftheSkidmore factors. First,
the majority observed, the position taken by the EEOC "'contradicts
the position which [it] had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to
the enactment of the governing statute."" 1 Second, the majority
noted, "[tihe EEOC offers no basis in its experience for the
147. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251.
148. See id. at 248 (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)).
149. See Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. at 1665, 1666 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("It must be noted that neither petitioners' brief nor the brief for the United
States as amicus curiae actually relies upon this canon [of expressio unius].").
150. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
151. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142
(1976)).
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change."'52 The .majority concluded "even when considered in
combination with petitioners' other arguments, the EEOC's inter-
pretation is insufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption
against extraterritorial application."5 ' Thus,Aramco separated the
inquiries and applied Skidmore factors to assess the appropriate
weight of the agency's interpretation even where the Court was not
independently persuaded by the agency's interpretation. This
application of Skidmore stands in stark contrast to that of the
Christensen majority.
Aramco's approach to applying Skidmore finds support in other
cases. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 4 the case that purportedly
revived Skidmore in the 1970s,' the Court also relied on Skidmore
in refusing to agree with an EEOC guideline interpreting Title VII.
The Court in Gilbert ultimately found the EEOC interpretation
unpersuasive; however, it did not "wholly discount the weight" of
the EEOC guideline, instead reasoning that the guideline "does not
receive high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in
Skidmore."5 6 The Court observed that the EEOC guideline was not
a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII and that it
contradicted an earlier EEOC position.' Thus, the Court reasoned,
it lacked persuasive force pursuant to the Skidmore factors. The
Gilbert case is significant for its adding of contemporaneousness to
the Skidmore factors.
Under Aramco and Gilbert, Skidmore advises a sliding scale of
deference, or "respect," based on its factors of agency expertise,
consistency, contemporaneous, and thoroughness of consideration.
This approach differs from the approach of the Christensen
majority, which does not apply Skidmore deference unless an
agency interpretation is deemed to be persuasive. The approach of
Aramco and Gilbert is more consistent with the language of the
Skidmore opinion, as well as the normative rationales for deference
articulated in Skidmore. Skidmore deference is not as strong as the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 258.
154. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
155. See Yavelberg, supra note 12, at 175 (asserting that Gilbert "revived a then-dormant
Skidmore doctrine").
156. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 143.
157. See id. at 142.
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deference advised in other circumstances, such as where Chevron
applies, but it is still deference for a reason. As the Court noted in
Skidmore, agencies have more expertise than reviewing courts and
there is also a uniformity interest in applying some deference even
to agencyinterpretive statements.5 ' Skidmore strikes a balance, by
heightening the review standard to promote legitimacy without
abandoning deference altogether.'59 The majorityin Christensen, by
contrast, throws the baby of deference out with the bathwater of
agency legal interpretations outside of the notice-and-comment
rulemaking or adjudication contexts. If courts follow the Skidmore
approach of the Christensen majority, they risk eviscerating the
presumption of validity for agency actions outside of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, thrusting the judiciary into second guessing
agency interpretations of statutes. While there may be small
legitimacy gains to independent judicial review of questions of law
with no presumption of validity, the uniformity and judicial
resource costs are potentially high. The approach of the Christensen
dissents, in considering the institutional factors without
abandoning the presumption of validity, is sounder in light of the
Skidmore case and its normative rationales, as well as later cases
applying Skidmore.6 °
C. Skidmore as Reasonableness With a Bite
Although Justice Breyer's dissent is not inconsistent with the
second approach to Skidmore deference-like Justice Stevens, he
explicitly applies the Skidmore factors to assess the "persuasive
force" of the agency's interpretation161"-he also raises a third
158. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 251 (1998) (asserting that Skidmore strikes a middle
ground by giving agency interpretation influence without making them binding or giving
them no weight).
160. See, e.g., Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 83-84 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Skidmore
factors to uphold agency legal interpretation embodied in an interpretive rule); Mayburg v.
Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105-07 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.)
(finding agency interpretation unpersuasive in light of congressional intent, despite
independent assessment of its "'power to persuade pursuant to the Skidmore factors
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 34, 140 (1944))).
161. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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possibility. He hints, and implicitly endorses, that Skidmore can be
understood within the architecture of Chevron deference, not as an
alternative to Chevron deference. In particular, Skidmore might be
conceptualized as a type of reasonableness inquiry at step two of
Chevron.'62 The question, then, should be whether a court chooses
to invoke reasonableness review pursuant to the Skidmore factors
or to use strong deference without a hard look, not whether Chevron
should apply.
Something similar to this approach was endorsed by a Third
Circuit panel in Cleary v. Waldman.161 Cleary addressed the appro-
priate deference for Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) inter-
pretations in the context of a private challenge to New Jersey's
implementation of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
(MCCA). The plaintiffs maintained that the MCCA precludes New
Jersey from adopting a definition of "community spouse's income"
for determining thresholds for Medicare allowances by any method
other than the resource-first approach.16' By contrast, "[b]oth HCFA
and HHS [had] stated in policy memoranda and letters that states
may adopt either the income-first or the resource-first method and
that [the MCCA] permits consideration of potential income
transfers from one spouse to another."'65 In assessing what weight
to afford the agency interpretations, the court began by applying
step one of Chevron, but found the definition of "community
spouse's income" to be ambiguous. 66 The court then moved on to
step two of Chevron, but it did not apply routine step-two
reasonableness review. The agencies had not adopted their
interpretations through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 61
Nevertheless, the court reasoned, the agencies have "delegated
authority to administer the statute and the views are made 'in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience
and broader investigations and information than is likely to come
162. This conceptualization stands in contrast to that advanced by Professor Michael Herz,
who argues that Skidmore deference should apply at step one of Chevron. See Herz, supra
note 13, at 208-09.
163. 167 F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 1999).
164. See id. at 804-07 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(eX2XC) (1994)).
165. Id. at 806.
166. See id. at 807.
167. See id.
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to ajudge,'" so Skidmore deference applies. 6 ' The court then tested
the agencies' interpretations against Skidmore standards, noting
that an agency legal interpretation "will be given deference as long
as it is consistent with other agency pronouncements and furthers
the purposes of the Act." 69 Instead of understanding Chevron and
Skidmore as alternative tests, this approach synthesizes the two
within Chevron's architecture. The approach, implicit in Justice
Breyer's dissent, has many advantages over the other approaches
endorsed by the Christensen Court.
First, even when courts review the types of agency statements for
which Skidmore would normally apply, they presumably engage in
the Chevron step-one inquiry. In other words, if the statute speaks
unambiguously to the question at hand, a court will gauge the
legality of agency action without regard to deference. Skidmore or
Chevron deference issues arise only when the statute is silent or
ambiguous. Thus, at least insofar as step one of Chevron is
concerned, the two tests are identical. Professor Michael Herz has
argued that the Skidmore test should apply at Chevron's step on17°
but while this may enhance judicial oversight of agencies, it creates
disincentives for accountable legislation by Congress. His argument
is premised on the assertion that statutory ambiguity does not
necessarily end the step-one inquiry because "Congress might mean
to express something but do so ambiguously."' 7' If Chevron had
Congress's intent as its exclusive normative rationale, Professor
Herz's argument would be convincing. However, even Justice
Scalia, one of the strongest advocates of the congressional intent
justification for Chevron deference,' 2 has been inclined to treat
ambiguous statutes at step two of Chevron.' The normative
rationale for treating ambiguous statutes at step two is not
based exclusively in congressional intent. It also recognizes
the institutional incentives judicial deference creates for more
168. Id. at 807-08 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
169. Id. at 808 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. C.I.R., 41 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir.
1994); Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1994)).
170. See Herz, supra note 13, at 209-09.
171. Id. at 207.
172. See The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (arguing that the theoretical justification for Chevron
deference is based in Congress's intent).
173. See Christensen v. Harris, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1664-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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transparent and accountable congressional decision making. If
Congress legislates with the expectation-reinforced by a legal
rule-that courts will defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes, Congress will use more precise language where it
intends otherwise, enhancing the transparency and accountability
of congressional law delegating authority to administrative
agencies."' An architecture of deference that reads Skidmore
deference into step one of Chevron completely undermines this
incentive.
Second, the distinction between Chevron and Skidmore deference,
as applied by the Christensen Court, is intertwined with an
evaluation of whether the agency mode speaks with the "force of
law"'75 or whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive
authority to the agency.176 The "force of law" inquiry is itself a
function of Congress's intent regarding the scope of the agency's
delegated power. For instance, where an interpretation binds
parties as well as the agency-and Congress intended as
much-courts are more likely to extend Chevron deference. 177
The inquiry into whether Congress intended to delegate in-
terpretive powers is mentioned in Chevron,'7 s and has been
reiterated many times since. 179 Just as in other contexts where
courts have attempted to evaluate the sufficiency of a congressional
delegation, 8 ° however, courts are hardly predictable or consistent
174. The purpose of Chevron's step one, in other words, is to give Congress an incentive
to draft clear statutes-not to bail Congress out in those instances where it has failed to do
so. Cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,545-48 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (rejecting agency's construction of a statute, noting that where Congress had
wanted to use clear language it did so); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 682 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (same).
175. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662 (noting that interpretation contained in policy
statements, agency manuals and enforcement guidelines all "lack the force of law").
176. See id. at 1668 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that there are circumstances of
statutory ambiguity where Chevron may not apply, and that the inquiry hinges on whether
"Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive authority to the agency").
177. See id. at 1662; Herz, supra note 13, at 193-200. Anthony, supra note 60, argues that
the critical inquiry is whether Congress intends to bind the courts.
178. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
179. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1314 (2000);
Smileyv. CitiBank, 517 U.S. 735,740-41 (1996); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,151 (1991);
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1988).
180. For example, many commentators argue that the constitutional nondelegation
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in evaluating whether sufficient lawmaking authority has been
delegated to agencies."8' In evaluating intent, judges will
disagree-as do members of the Court-on what interpretive aids
are appropriate, as well as on the role of legislative history."8 2
Inconsistencies in judicial decisions regarding the scope of
Chevron's application risk thwarting the uniformity advantages
associated with either Chevron or Skidmore deference."'3 Instead of
relying on a hopelessly indeterminate judicial inquiry into whether
Congress intended to- delegate interpretive authority to an
agency-and whether agency modes of decision speak with the
"force of law'--a synthetic approach adjusts the standard of
reasonableness review based on a process consideration. The
relevant touchstone is not Congress's intent, but the procedure the
agency used in making its interpretation."8 4 If the agency employed
transparent processes lending themselves to open participation
and deliberation, such as adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, this will be reflected in the record subject to judicial
inquiry on appeal. A reasonableness standard of review, em-
bellished by the hard-look doctrine, would be appropriate. By
doctrine is unenforceable because courts are unable to provide principled ways of
enforcement. See Richard B. Stewart,Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323,324
(1987) (noting that there are no 'judicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish
permissible from impermissible delegations"); see also Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1128-30 (1977); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L.
REv. 391, 393-403 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1244-47 (1989); Stewart, supra,
at 325-28.
181. Compare Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring "a
congressional delegation of administrative authority" as a precondition to the application of
Chevron), with Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1668 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
application of Chevron requires a clear delegation of interpretive authority).
182. For discussion of these disagreements, see Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Place for a 'Legislative History" ofAgency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2000).
183. See Asimow, supra note 9, at 1203-06 (noting uniformity concerns with Skidmore
deference); Strauss, supra note 36.
184. In contrast to this approach, in U.S. v. Med Professor Thomas Merrill filed an
amicus brief urging the Court to use Congress's intent to delegate the authority to bind
private parties as the "keyvariable" for application of Chevron deference. See BriefofAmicus
Curiae of Professor Thomas Merrill In Support of Petitioner, United States v. Mead Corp.,
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1434). Merrill coupled this approach with an
assessment of procedural mode, but the synthetic approach defended here hinges entirely on
procedural mode, not an assessment of congressional intent to bind.
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contrast, as in Cleary, where informal action, adopted through
nontransparent procedures, is behind the agency's interpretive
statement, application of the Skidmore factors provides courts with
a heightened inquiry, adjusting to the nature of the action and
quality of process, reasons, and explanations behind it.'85
Third, a synthetic approach retains the heightened review
necessary to promote the legitimacy of agency statements that have
not undergone full notice-and-comment rulemaking. In applying
Skidmore's factors, courts consider factors that parallel those they
consider in "hard look" reasonableness review. When an agency has
not engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is not legally
obligated under the APA to produce an explanation for its decision.
Nevertheless, an agency's provision of documents or rationales,
subject to judicial review, will enhance the legitimacy of the
agency's decision.
Professor Mark Seidenfeld has argued that step-two Chevron
review is so lenient that it is almost meaningless.'86 Incorporation
of Skidmore criteria into the step-two inquiry will work to enhance
the accountability of agency action where the adjudication or notice-
and-comment process has not contributed to its legitimacy. The
Skidmore factors provide a way for courts to focus their inquiry
at step two in ways that are important in promoting the legitimacy
of informal action, nudging more deliberative agency decision
making where courts cannot take comfort with the protections
provided by the notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication procedures.
185. Cleary itself falls short of this approach. As a precondition to invoking the Chevron
framework, the court required "a congressional delegation of administrative authority."
Cleary, 167 F.3d at 808 (citing Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990)).
186. See Seidenfeld, supra note 34, at 84; see also Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHM.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997) (noting that as of 1997 the
Supreme Court had never struck down an agency interpretation by relying squarely on
Chevron's step two). In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), however,
the Supreme Court relied on Chevron's step two to reverse the agency's decision. InAmerican
Trucking, the Court recently held an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision to be unreasonable, see 121 S. Ct. 903, 916-17 (2001) (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525
U.S. at 392), presumably also relying on step two of Chevron. Others might read Iowa
Utilities Board andAmerican Trucking as Chevron step-one cases. I am not inclined to agree
with this interpretation, for policy reasons, see supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text,
as well as that it leaves little consequence to Chevron step two.
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In articulating the Skidmore factors, the Supreme Court
portended some of the factors it would later endorse in its "hard
look" approach to judicial review, applicable to a broader range of
cases, including those involving rulemaking and adjudication. In
"hard look" review, the Supreme Court has stated that a rule
Would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.17
The notice-and-comment process binds the agency legally to
produce explanatory material in the form of a statement of general
basis and purpose,"' and the rigors of hard-look review work to
promote deliberation and accountability in this process. Skidmore's
factors relating to agency expertise and thoroughness of
consideration strongly parallel the considerations of the hard-look
test at step two of Chevron. The hard-look test, for example, might
provide courts additional guidance in assessing the "thoroughness
of consideration" necessary to justify the agency action.
The Skidmore test, however, appears notablymore rigorous than
the routine reasonableness inquiry at Chevron's step two.
Skidmore's other factors, relating to consistency and the contem-
poraneousness of a construction, add an additional layer of scrutiny
to the hard-look inquiry for informal statements. Skidmore's
consistency factor, along with contemporaneousness, added by
Gilbert,"8 9 serves three purposes. Reliance interests are protected,
because regulated entities have some confidence in the certainty of
the agency's position. Another purpose of requiring consistency is
that agencies may be deterred from bypassing notice-and-comment
rulemaking processes when they adopt a new interpretation,
enhancing the legitimacy of the regulatory process. And a third
purpose is to aid courts in assessing statutory meaning, because
187. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
188. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
189. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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consistent and contemporaneous positions are more likely to reflect
congressional intent or acquiescence than inconsistent or recent
interpretations.190
Even where Skidmore does not apply, reasonableness review
cases value consistency, suggestingthat agencies must explain their
departures from previous positions. 9' Given the additional
legitimacy concerns of agency legal interpretations adopted in
informal, nontransparent processes, however, the consistency and
contemporaneous construction factors of Skidmore are notably
stronger, detracting from the persuasive force of an agency's legal
interpretation.
A significant advantage to conceptualizing Skidmore deference as
a type of step-two inquiry is that it promotes legitimacy and
uniformity without sacrificing flexibility. 192 Of all of the Skidmore
factors, consistency seems most widely used by courts.193 If the
190. Professor Asimow argues, for example, that Skidmore's factors, as applied by
California state courts, serve two purposes: judicial recognition of the agency's comparative
institutional advantage, and an invocation of deference where the agency's interpretation is
probably correct. The consistency and contemporaneous factors are particularly useful in
evaluating the correctness of the agency's interpretation. See Asimow, supra note 9, at 1196-
98.
191. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,808
(1973) (holding that the agency's ground for departing from previous decisions "must be
clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency's action
and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency's mandate'). Justice Breyer,
while a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, explained this obligation:
[T]he Board remains free to modify or change its rule; to depart from, or to keep
within, prior precedent, as long as it focuses upon the issue and explains why
change is reasonable. Unless an agency either follows or consciously changes
the rules developed in its precedent, those subject to the agency's authority
cannot use its precedent as a guide for their conduct; nor will that precedent
check arbitrary agency action.
Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (citations
omitted).
192. Professor Asimow, in urging California courts to adopt Skidmore "weak deference,"
argues that weak deference promotes accuracy, uniformity, efficiency, and creates desirable
incentives for accountable decision making by agencies. See Asimow, supra note 9, at 1203-
06. He falls short, however, of adopting weak deference in the context of Chevron, instead
suggesting it as an alternative to the Chevron framework. His approach was adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Yamaha Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031,
1038-39 (Cal. 1998), which applied Skidmore deference to an agency interpretation adopted
outside of the rulemaking and adjudication processes.
193. See, e.g., Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999); West v. Bowen, 879
F.2d 1122, 1134 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing to Third
Circuit cases on consistency); Wilcoxv. Ives, 864 F.2d 915,924-25 (1st Cir. 1988); Barnett v.
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consistency factor is assessed independent of a reasonableness
inquiry, however, courts will be more disposed to allowing a
preexisting interpretation to hamstring an agency's regulatory
policies, thwarting an agency's ability to change interpretations
outside of formal regulatory processes. Even under Skidmore,
though, an agency is not precluded from changing its interpretive
position so long as the thoroughness of the explanation of the
agency's consideration, reflected in the reasons it provides, is
sufficient to override any inconsistency that might detract from the
persuasive force of the agency's interpretation. 9" The consistency
factor plays an important role in protecting the legitimacy of agency
informal interpretations, but even Skidmore does not bind the
agency to previous interpretations. If an agency has thoroughly
considered and explained a change in policy, binding the agency to
its initial interpretation would undermine the flexibility in the
regulatory process. The cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking for
agencies is well-documented."' Agencies need some degree of
flexibility to adapt interpretations, even through informal
procedures. 96 But if an agency makes a change in its legal
interpretation through an informal procedure, it should be expected
to thoroughly consider and explain its deviation from previous
Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1987); St. Lukes Hosp. v. Secretary of Health
and Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325,331 (1st Cir. 1987); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1565 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
194. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,257 (1991) (suggesting that an
agency may offer reasons based on its experience for a change in a legal interpretation). One
Third Circuit decision observes the distinction between a change and a "sharp" change,
suggesting that the latter is entitled to less deference than the former. See West, 879 F.2d
at 1134(Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting). Both types ofchanges, however, warrant
some deference; a sharp change may just require amore complete and thorough explanation,
everything else equal, to justify the interpretation.
195. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuKE L.J. 1385,1419-20 (1992) (noting the impact judicial review may have on agency's
willingness to use notice-and-comment rulemaking).
196. Inadditionto coheringwithSkidmore, changes in agencylegal interpretations do not
necessarily require notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. In Chief Probation
Officers of California v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1997), retired Justice White, siting
by designation and writing for a panel of the Ninth Circuit, opined that an informal rule that
changes agency policy does not necessarily require notice-and-comment rulemaking under
the APA. Justice White reasoned, to trigger notice-and-comment, "the rule would have to be
inconsistent with another rule having the force of law, not just any agency interpretation
regardless of whether it had been codified." Id. at 1337. Accord Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d
73 (1st Cir. 1998).
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positions. Skidmore allows this, but courts must take the
thoroughness of consideration factor seriously in evaluating the
reasonableness of the agency's decision. In this sense, Skidmore
might be considered a hard look with a special emphasis on
consistency and the depth of reasoning-rather than routine
rationality review, which focuses more on coherence than the
thoroughness or depth of the agency's reasoning-given the
legitimacy concerns of informal agencyinterpretations. So, although
an agency issuing an interpretive rule or opinion letter is not legally
obligated under the APA to produce reasons supporting its decision,
agencies expecting some type of reasonableness review
incorporating the Skidrnore factors will be more likely to do so.
Conceptualizing Skidmore as reasonableness with a bite will
enhance the accountability and deliberativeness of the agency
interpretations in informal contexts. It promotes legitimacy without
requiring de novo review of the issues of law, which potentially
undermines the uniformity and accountability values of providing
some deference to agency interpretations of law.
Of no small significance, this approach simplifies the judicial
inquiry and holds promise to bridge the gap between the
Christensen opinions issued by the Supreme Court's administrative
law scholars, Justices Scalia and Breyer. ConceptualizingSkidmore
as reasonableness with a bite at Chevron's step two responds to
Justice Scalia's concern with the resort to a judicial inquiry into
congressional intent prior to the application of Chevron deference.
At the same time, it endorses the approach implicit in Justice
Breyer's dissent, while also recognizing that heightened
reasonableness review contributes to the legitimacy of agency legal
interpretations adopted through less transparent and deliberative
procedures.
CONCLUSION
Christensen resolves a significant issue regardingwhen Skidmore
as opposed to Chevron deference applies to agency legal
interpretations, but it also creates uncertainty regarding how
Skidmore should be applied. As courts are thrust into applying
Skidmore deference, they should shy away from the approach of the
Christensen majority, which gives no more than a brusque nod to
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Skidmore. The approach of the majority, eviscerating the pre-
sumption ofvalidity for agency action, is not supported bySkidmore
or later cases and undermines the rationales for deference, even in
the Skidmore context. An approach truer to precedent relies on
institutional factors to gauge the persuasive force of the agency's
interpretation. Courts applying Skidmore should favor this
approach over that of the Christensen majority. Better still, a
Chevron ISkidmore synthesis-reasonableness with a bite-holds
promise to simplify the judicial review inquiry, simultaneously
promoting uniformity and accountability without sacrificing the
legitimacy of heightened review or the tradition of different types
of deference. Even when it is not absolute, judicial review of
informal agency legal interpretations can promote the legitimacy of
agency statements adopted by procedures that are not as
transparent as adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking.
